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 Salman Rushdie once said, no doubt under duress, that secular humanism 
was itself a religion, thereby selling short both religion and secular humanism 
in one breath. I reckon (this is a conjecture) that he made that equation so that 
he could repudiate the charge of apostasy. One cannot, after all, be committing 
apostasy if one is only opposing one religion with another. Under the threat of 
execution, one may be allowed a confused thought, but with a clear mind no 
one with even a vestigial understanding of the mentalities and the realities of 
religion or the aspirations of secular humanism would be tempted by Rushdie’s 
equation.
 Though his equation itself may be quite wrong, I do now want to briefly 
pursue with some variation, a theme it opens up.
What I want to ask is really a familiar question, and trace some of the philosophical 
attitudes and intellectual history that make it familiar, the question whether there 
can be in the secular a form of continuity with something in the religious, in my 
view a continuity which actually stood for a particular form of humane radical 
politics that was very early on thwarted by a very specific notion of scientific 
rationality, which in this lecture I will call a “thick” notion of scientific rationality. 
By constantly appealing to this notion of scientific rationality, a dominant orthodox 
strand in thinking about the Enlightenment has consistently tarnished a certain 
kind of radical questioning of this orthodoxy with charges of irrationalism. It is 
worth exposing a sleight of hand in all this.
 A good place to begin is with Gandhi, a humanist and secularist yet by open 
declaration opposed to the Enlightenment and also avowedly a Hindu, even if 
by the lights of high Hinduism, a highly heterodox one. I will be focusing (and 
focusing selectively) only on Gandhi’s thought and writing and not his political 
interventions during the long freedom movement. What Gandhi says about the 
Enlightenment as well as, what he often omnibusly called, “the West,” relates 
closely to his view of science.
 In careless moments, Gandhi often said that it was a predisposition of science 
from its earliest days that it would lead to a way of thinking that was disastrous 
for politics and culture in ways that he outlined in great detail. This notion of 
a predisposition is obscure because general claims about the predispositions of 
something like science (something that is at once a theoretical pursuit as well 
as a practice, something that is defined in terms that are at once conceptual, 
methodological, and institutional) are hard to pin down and study, let alone 
confirm or refute, if they are intended to be empirical hypotheses. So, in this 
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lecture, I will instead sympathetically read his hunch about such a predisposition 
by situating it in a certain intellectual history. At the end of this exercise, it will 
emerge that a far better way to put his point would be in terms, not of an empirical 
hypothesis about ‘science’ as a self-standing human cognitive enterprise, but rather 
to see it as a critique of a certain very specific notion of scientific ‘rationality’.
 The notion of rationality as it governed our thought about history and 
politics and culture has in the past–famously--taken an idealized form, with 
a progressivist or developmental, conception of these subjects; and for a few 
decades now that has been under a thoroughly critical scrutiny, as is the notion 
of modernity with which it is so often coupled. Much more often than not the 
telos that defines the progressivist trajectory is in terms of an envisaged ideal or 
end-point and the dialectic by which the end is (or is to be) realized is the large 
subject of the relevant historiography. Yet it is sometimes more fruitful to focus 
on the beginnings of such a sequence, since it may give a more truthful sense of 
the notions of rationality that are at stake than those defined by an idealized 
statement of the normative end. So I will argue.
 In general, a sequence, especially when it is consecutively narrativized and 
dialectically and cumulatively conceived, as progressive ideals are bound to 
conceive it, cannot have started from the beginning of thought and culture itself. 
If a sequence is to aspire to conceptual and cultural significance (as the very 
idea of progress suggests) it cannot have its beginnings at the very beginning of 
conceptual and cultural life. That would trivialize things — evacuate the notion 
of sequence of any of the substance and significance that progressivist narrative 
aspires to. It cannot be that we have been converging on this significant end from 
the random inceptions of our intellectual and cultural existence. One assumes 
rather that there were many strands at the outset, endless false leads, but then 
at some point (what I am calling the beginning of the progressivist trajectory) we 
got set on a path, which we think of as the right path, from which point on the 
idea of cumulative steps towards a broadly specifiable end began to make sense, 
a path of convergence towards that end. Accumulation and convergence, then, 
don’t start at the beginning of thought, but rather they start at some juncture 
that we think of as the start onto a right path.
 This has many implications for historiography, some of them highly critical. 
Just to give you one example, I think, it implies a real difficulty for philosophers 
such as Hilary Putnam when they say that scientific realism is true because it is 
the only explanation of the fact that there is a convergence in scientific theories-
-that is to say, the posits of science must be real because it is only their reality 
which would explain the cumulative nature of the claims of scientific theories 
over time. What is the difficulty with this that I have in mind? It is this. Here 
too, the fact is that these converging and cumulative trends have not existed 
since the beginning of theorizing about nature. In fact Putnam would be the 
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first to say that it is only sometime in the seventeenth century that we were set 
on the right path in science and from then on there has been a convergence that 
is best explained by the corresponding reality of what the converging scientific 
theories posit. But now a question arises. What makes it the case that that is 
when we were set on the right path? What is the notion of rightness, here? If we 
have an answer to this last question (about what makes the path the right path at 
that starting point), then that notion of rightness would already have established 
scientific realism and we don’t need to wheel in scientific realism to explain the 
subsequent convergence.
 Well, my subject is not the merits of such well known arguments nor even 
scientific realism but the point I am making is generalizable to efforts that 
characterize modernity in progressivist terms, indeed it is even generalizable to 
interesting recent efforts to characterize modernity in sequential terms that are 
not progressivist.1 These too cannot avoid the hard question of the sequence’s 
starting point, which may have the greater power to illuminate than the sequence 
itself.
 So let me explore these beginnings briefly by recording the detailed affinities 
between Gandhi’s ideas about science and the metaphysical and political and 
cultural anxieties that first surfaced at the very site and time of the new science as 
it first began to be formulated in the seventeenth century in the West. There are 
many passages in Gandhi’s dispatches to Young India and also in some passages 
in his book Hind Swaraj2 that suggest a line of argument something like this.
 Sometime in the seventeenth century we were set on a path in which we were given 
the intellectual sanction to see nature as–to use a Weberian notion—“disenchanted.” 
This coincided with the period of the great revolutionary changes in scientific 
theory, so Gandhi crudely equated it with science itself and its newly and self-
consciously formulated experimental methods. And he saw in it a conception 
of nature whose pursuit left us disengaged from nature as a habitat, and which 
instead engendered a zeal to control it rather than merely live in it. And my 
claim is that these criticisms by Gandhi have extraordinarily close and striking 
antecedents in a tradition of thought that goes all the way back to the second half 
of the seventeenth century in England and then elsewhere in Europe, simultaneous 
with the great scientific achievements of that time. It goes back, that is, to just 
the time and the place when the outlook of scientific “rationality” that many 
place at the defining centre of what they call the “West,” was being formed, and 
it is that very outlook with its threatening cultural and political consequences 
that is the target of that early critique.
 It should be said emphatically right at the outset that the achievements of the 
“new science” of the seventeenth century were neither denied nor opposed by 
the critique I have in mind, and so the critique cannot be dismissed as Luddite 
reaction to the new science, as Gandhi’s critique is bound to seem, coming 
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centuries later, when the science is no longer “new” and its effects on our lives, 
which the earlier critique was warning against, seem like a fait accompli. What the 
critique opposed was a development in outlook that emerged in the philosophical 
surround of the scientific achievements. In other words, what it opposed was just 
the notion of what I am calling a “thick” rationality that is often described in 
glowing terms today as “scientific rationality.” What do I have in mind by calling 
it a “thick” notion (a term I am recognizably borrowing from Clifford Geertz)?
 To put a range of complex, interweaving themes in the crudest summary, the 
dispute was about the very nature of nature and matter and, relatedly therefore, 
about the role of the deity, and of the broad cultural and political implications of 
the different views on these metaphysical and religious concerns. The metaphysical 
picture that was promoted by Newton (the official Newton of the Royal Society, 
not the neo-Platonist of his private study) and Boyle, among others, viewed matter 
and nature as brute and inert. On this view, since the material universe was brute, 
God was externally conceived with all the familiar metaphors of the “clock winder” 
giving the universe a push from the outside to get it in motion. In the dissenting 
tradition--which was a scientific tradition, for there was in fact no disagreement 
between it and Newton/Boyle on any serious detail of the scientific laws, and 
all the fundamental notions such as gravity, for instance, were perfectly in place, 
though given a quite different metaphysical interpretation--matter was not brute and 
inert, but rather was shot through with an inner source of dynamism responsible 
for motion, that was itself divine. God and nature were not separable as in the 
official metaphysical picture that was growing around the new science, and John 
Toland, for instance, to take just one example among the active dissenting voices, 
openly wrote in terms he proclaimed to be “pantheistic.”3
 The link with Gandhi in all this is vivid. One absolutely central claim of 
the freethinkers of this period was about the political and cultural significance 
of their disagreements with the fast developing metaphysical orthodoxy of the 
“Newtonians.” Just as Gandhi did, they argued that it is only because one takes 
matter to be “brute” and “stupid,” to use Newton’s own terms, that one would 
find it appropriate to conquer it with nothing but profit and material wealth as 
ends, and thereby destroy it both as a natural and a human environment for one’s 
habitation. In today’s terms, one might think that this point was a seventeenth 
century predecessor to our ecological concerns but though there certainly was 
an early instinct of that kind, it was embedded in a much more general point 
(as it was with Gandhi too), a point really about how nature in an ancient and 
spiritually flourishing sense was being threatened and how therefore this was in 
turn threatening to our moral psychology of engagement with it, including the 
relations and engagement among ourselves as its inhabitants.
 Today, the most thoroughly and self-consciously secular sensibilities may recoil 
from the term “spiritually,” as I have just deployed it, though I must confess to 
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finding myself feeling no such self-consciousness despite being a secularist, indeed 
an atheist. The real point has nothing to do with these rhetorical niceties. If one 
had no use for the word, if one insisted on having the point made with words that 
we today can summon with confidence and accept without qualm, it would do 
no great violence to the core of their thinking to say this: the dissenters thought 
of the world not as brute but as suffused with value. That they happened to think 
the source of such value was divine ought not to be the deepest point of interest 
for us. The point rather is that if it were laden with value, it would make normative 
(ethical and social) demands on one, whether one was religious or not, normative 
demands therefore that did not come merely from our own instrumentalities and 
subjective utilities. And it is this sense of forming commitments by taking in, in 
our perceptions, an evaluatively “enchanted” world which--being enchanted in this 
way--therefore moved us to normatively constrained engagement with it, that the 
dissenters contrasted with the outlook that was being offered by the ideologues 
of the new science.4 A brute and disenchanted world could not move us to any 
such engagement since any perception of it, given the sort of thing it was, would 
necessarily be a detached form of observation; and if one ever came out of this 
detachment, if there was ever any engagement with a world so distantly conceived, 
so external to our own sensibility, it could only take the form of mastery and 
control of something alien, with a view to satisfying the only source of value 
allowed by this outlook–our own utilities and gain.
 We are much used to the lament that we have long been living in a world 
governed by overwhelmingly commercial motives. What I have been trying to 
do is to trace this (just as Gandhi did) to its deepest conceptual sources and that 
is why the seventeenth century is so central to a proper understanding of this 
world. Familiarly drawn connections and slogans, like "Religion and the Rise of 
Capitalism", are only the beginning of such a tracing.
 In his probing book, A Grammar of Motives, Kenneth Burke says that "the 
experience of an impersonal outlook was empirically intensified in proportion 
as the rationale of the monetary motive gained greater authority…."5 This gives 
us a glimpse of the sources. As he says, one had to have an impersonal angle on 
the world to see it as the source of profit and gain, and vice versa. But I have 
claimed that the sources go deeper. It is only when we see the world as Boyle 
and Newton did, as against the freethinkers and dissenters, that we understand 
further why there was no option but this impersonality in our angle on the 
world. A desacralized world, to put it in the dissenting terms of that period, left 
us no other angle from which to view it, but an impersonal one. There could be 
no normative constraint coming upon us from a world that was brute. It could 
not move us to engagement with it on its terms. All the term-making came from 
us. We could bring whatever terms we wished to such a world; and since we 
could only regard it impersonally, it being brute, the terms we brought in our 
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actions upon it were just the terms that Burke describes as accompanying such 
impersonality, the terms of “the monetary” motives for our actions. Thus it is, 
that the metaphysical issues regarding the world and nature, as they were debated 
around the new science, provide the deepest conceptual sources.
 The conceptual sources that we have traced are various but they were not 
miscellaneous. The diverse conceptual elements of religion, capital, nature, 
metaphysics, rationality, science, were tied together in a highly deliberate integration, 
that is to say in deliberately accruing worldly alliances. Newton’s and Boyle’s 
metaphysical view of the new science won out over the freethinkers’ and became 
official only because it was sold to the Anglican establishment and, in an alliance 
with that establishment, to the powerful mercantile and incipient industrial 
interests of the period in thoroughly predatory terms--terms which stressed 
that how we conceive nature may now be transformed into something, into the 
kind of thing, that is indefinitely available for our economic gain by processes 
of extraction, processes such as mining, deforestation, plantation agriculture 
intended essentially as what we today would call “agrobusines.” None of these 
processes could have taken on the unthinking and yet systematic prevalence that 
they first began to get in this period unless one had ruthlessly revised existing 
ideas of a world animated by a divine presence. From an anima mundi, one could 
not simply proceed to take at whim and will. Not that one could not or did not, 
till then, take at all. But in the past in a wide range of social worlds, such taking 
as one did had to be accompanied by ritual offerings of reciprocation which 
were intended to show respect towards as well to restore the balance in nature, 
offerings made both before and after cycles of planting, and even hunting. The 
point is that, in general, the revision of such an age-old conception of nature 
was achieved in tandem with a range of seemingly miscellaneous elements that 
were brought together in terms that stressed a future of endlessly profitable 
consequences that would accrue if one embraced this particular metaphysics of 
the new science and built, in the name of a notion of rationality around it, the 
institutions of an increasingly centralized political oligarchy (an incipient state) 
and an established religious orthodoxy of Anglicanism that had penetrated the 
universities as well, to promote these very specific interests. These were the very 
terms that the freethinkers found alarming for politics and culture, alarming for 
the local and egalitarian ways of life that some decades earlier the radical elements 
in the English Revolution such as the Levellers, Diggers, Quakers, Ranters, 
and other groups had articulated and fought for. Gandhi, much later, spoke in 
political terms that were poignantly reminiscent of these radical sectaries and, in 
Hind Swaraj and other writings, he wrote about science and its relations to these 
political terms in ways that echoed the alarm of the somewhat later scientific 
dissenters.
 These scientific dissenters themselves often openly avowed that they had 
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inherited the political attitudes of these radical sectaries in England of about 
fifty years earlier and appealed to their instinctive, hermetic, neo-Platonist, and 
sacralized views of nature, defending them against the conceptual assaults of the 
official Newton/Boyle view of matter. In fact, the natural philosophies of Anthony 
Collins and John Toland and his Socratic Brotherhood (and their counterparts 
in the Netherlands drawing inspiration from Spinoza’s pantheism, and spreading 
to France and elsewhere in Europe, and then, when strongly opposed, going into 
secretive Masonic Lodges and other underground movements) were in many details 
anticipated by the key figures of the radical groups in that most dynamic period 
of English history, the 1640s, which had enjoyed hitherto unparalleled freedom 
of publication for about a decade or more to air their subversive and egalitarian 
views based on a quite different conception of nature. Gerard Winstanley, the 
most well known among them, declared that “God is in all motion” and “the 
truth is hid in every body” (my italics).6 This way of thinking about the corporeal 
realm had for Winstanley, as he puts it, a great “leveling purpose.” It allowed 
one to lay the ground, first of all, for a democratization of religion. If God was 
everywhere, then anyone may perceive the divine or find the divine within him 
or her, and therefore may be just as able to preach as a university-trained divine. 
But the opposition to the monopoly of so-called experts was intended to be 
more general than in just the religious sphere. Through their myriad polemical 
and instructional pamphlets, figures such as Winstanley, John Lilburne, Richard 
Overton, and others reached out and created a radical rank and file population 
which began to demand a variety of other things, including an elimination of 
tithes, a leveling of the legal sphere by a decentralizing of the courts and the 
elimination of feed lawyers, as well as the democratization of medicine by drastically 
reducing, if not eliminating, the costs of medicine, and disallowing canonical and 
monopoly status to the College of Physicians. The later scientific dissenters were 
very clear too that these were the very monopolies and undemocratic practices 
and institutions which would get entrenched if science, conceived in terms of 
the Newtonianism of the Royal Society, had its ideological victory.
 Equally, that is to say, conversely, the Newtonian ideologues of the Royal Society 
around the Boyle lectures started by Samuel Clarke saw themselves — without 
remorse — in just these conservative terms that the dissenters portrayed them in. 
They explicitly called Toland and a range of other dissenters, “enthusiasts” (a term 
of opprobrium at the time) and feared that their alternative picture of matter was 
an intellectual ground for the social unrest of the pre-Restoration period when 
the radical sectaries had such great, if brief and aborted, popular reach. They 
were effective in creating with the Anglican establishment a general conviction 
that the entire polity would require orderly rule by a state apparatus around a 
monarch serving the propertied classes and that this was just a mundane reflection, 
indeed a mundane version, of an externally imposed divine authority which kept 
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a universe of brute matter in orderly motion, rather than an immanently present 
God in all matter and in all persons, inspiring them with the enthusiasms to turn 
the “world upside down,” in Christopher Hill’s memorable, eponymous phrase. 
To see God in every body and piece of matter, they anxiously argued, was to lay 
oneself open to a polity and a set of civic and religious institutions that were 
beholden to popular rather than scriptural and learned judgement and opinion. 
They were just as effective in forging with the commercial interests over the next 
century, the idea that a respect for a sacralized universe would be an obstacle to 
taking with impunity what one could from nature’s bounty. By their lights, the 
only obstacles that now needed to be acknowledged and addressed had to do 
with the difficulties of mobilizing towards an economy geared to profit. No other 
factors of a more metaphysical and ideological kind should be allowed to interfere 
with these pursuits once nature had been transformed in our consciousness to a 
set of impersonally perceived “natural resources.”
 It was this scientific rationality, seized upon by just these established religious 
and economic alliances, that was later central to the colonizing mentality that 
justified the rapacious conquest of distant lands. The justification was merely an 
extension of the connections that I have outlined to colonized lands, which too 
were to be viewed as brute nature that was available for conquest and control--but 
only so long as one was able to portray the inhabitants of the colonized lands in infantilized 
terms, as a people who were as yet unprepared--by precisely a mental lack of such 
a notion of scientific rationality--to have the right attitudes towards nature and 
commerce and the statecraft that allows nature to be pursued for commercial 
gain. It is this integral linking of the new science through its metaphysics with 
these attitudes that I am calling the “thick” notion of scientific rationality.
 There is a fair amount of historical literature by now on the intellectual 
rationalizations of colonialism, but I have introduced the salient points of an 
earlier pre-colonial period’s critique here in order to point out that Gandhi’s 
criticisms had a very long and recognizable tradition going back to the seventeenth 
century in the heart of the West which anticipated in detail and with thoroughly 
honourable intent, those lamentable developments around the thick notion of 
scientific rationality. What he called, perhaps confusedly, a ‘predisposition’ of 
science itself, is exactly what was being expressed in these prescient anxieties that 
these early freethinkers were voicing about how these alliances around a certain 
outlook generated by the new science was “thickening” what should otherwise 
have been an innocuous (and “thin”) conception of science and rationality.
 Once that point is brought on to center stage, a standard strategy of the 
orthodox Enlightenment against fundamental criticisms raised against it, it 
is exposed as defensive posturing. It would be quite wrong and anachronistic 
to dismiss this initial and early intellectual and perfectly scientific source of 
critique, from which later critiques of the Enlightenment derived, as being 
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irrational, unless one is committed to a very specific orthodox understanding 
of the Enlightenment, of the sort I am inveighing against. It is essential to the 
argument of this lecture that far from being anti-Enlightenment, Gandhi’s early 
antecedents in the West, going back to the seventeenth century and in recurring 
heterodox traditions in the West since then, constitute what is, and rightly has 
been, called “the Radical Enlightenment.”7 To dismiss its pantheistic tendencies 
that I cited, as being unscientific and in violation of norms of rationality, would 
be to run together in a blatant slippage the general and “thin” use of terms like 
“scientific” and “rational” with just this “thick” notion of scientific rationality 
that we have identified above, which had the kind of politically and culturally 
disastrous consequences that the early dissenters were so jittery about. The appeal 
to scientific rationality as a defining feature of our modernity trades constantly on 
just such a slippage, subliminally appealing to the hurrah element of the general 
and “thin” terms “rational” and “scientific,” which we all applaud, to tarnish 
critics of the Enlightenment such as Gandhi, while ignoring the fact that the 
in their critique the opposition is to the thicker notion of scientific rationality, 
that was defined in terms of very specific scientific, religious, and commercial 
alliances.
 Were we to apply the thin conception of “scientific” and “rationality” (the one 
that I imagine most of us in this room embrace), the plain fact is that nobody in 
that period was, in any case, getting prizes for leaving God out of the world-view 
of science. That one should think of God as voluntaristically affecting nature 
from the outside (as the Newtonians did) rather than sacralizing it from within (as 
the freethinkers insisted), was not in any way to improve on the science involved. 
Both views were therefore just as “unscientific,” just as much in violation of 
scientific rationality, in the “thin” sense of that term that we would now take for 
granted. What was in dispute had nothing to do with science or rationality in that 
attenuated sense at all. What the early dissenting tradition as well as Gandhi were 
opposed to is the metaphysical orthodoxy that grew around Newtonian science 
and its implications for broader issues of culture and politics. This orthodoxy with 
all of its implications is what has now come to be called “scientific rationality” 
in the “thick” sense of that term and in the pervasive cheerleading about “the 
West” and about the “Enlightenment.” It has been elevated into a defining 
ideal, dismissing all opposition as irrationalist, with the hope that accusations of 
irrationality, because of the general stigma that the term imparts in its “thin” usage, 
will disguise the very specific and “thick” sense of rationality and irrationality 
that are actually being deployed by the opposition. Such (thick) irrationalism is 
precisely what the dissenters yearned for; and hindsight shows just how admirable 
a yearning it was.
 So the dismissals of Gandhi’s critique of the Enlightenment ideals as a kind 
of irrationalism and nostalgia have blinded us to making explicit the interpretative 
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possibilities for some of his thinking that are opened up by noting his affinities with 
a longstanding, dissenting tradition in the most radical period in English history. 
I am not suggesting for a moment that what was radical then could be retained 
without remainder as being radical today or even at the time when Gandhi was 
articulating his critique. But I am saying that it opens up liberating interpretative 
options for how to read Gandhi as being continuous with a tradition that was 
clear-eyed about what was implied by the “disenchantment” of the world, to stay 
with the Weberian term. It is a tradition consisting not just of Gandhi and the 
early seventeenth century freethinkers, but any number of remarkable literary 
and philosophical voices in between such as Blake, Shelley, Godwin, not all of 
Marx, but one strand in Marx, William Morris, Whitman and Dewey in this 
country, and countless voices of the non-traditional Left, from the freemasons 
in the early eighteenth century down to the heterodox Left in our own time, 
voices such as those of E.P. Thompson and Noam Chomsky, and the vast army 
of heroic but anonymous organizers of popular grass roots movements--in a word, 
the West as conceived by the “radical” Enlightenment which has refused to be 
complacent about the orthodox Enlightenment’s legacy of scientific rationality 
that the early dissenters in England had warned against well over three centuries 
ago.
 To move away now from the specific sacralized formulations of Gandhi and 
his antecedents in intellectual history, we should be asking in a much more 
general way, what their view amounts to, once we acknowledge that we have 
our own intellectual demands for more secular formulations. This is a tractable, 
historically situated, version of the question I began with: is there something 
interesting in the secular that is continuous with something in the religious? 
Even so situated, it is a very large question which requires a far more detailed 
inquiry than I can give in the little while I have left of what is already quite a 
long lecture, but I do want to say something now to give at least a very general 
and preliminary philosophical sense of what I think is the right direction for its 
answer.
 I had said earlier that our own secular ways of re-enchanting a world made 
brute by the rampant adoption of the ideologies around the thick notion of 
scientific rationality, turns on seeing the world as “suffused with value,” without 
any compulsion to see this as having its source in the pantheistic terms of a 
divinity.
 Here, then, is how I’ve allowed myself to think towards that idea. Spinoza, 
in a profound insight, pointed out that one cannot both intend to do something 
and predict that one will do it, at the same time. Predicting what one will do is 
done from a detached point of view, when one as it were steps outside of oneself 
and looks at oneself as others would, from a third person point of view. But 
intending is done from the first person point of view of agency itself. And we 
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cannot occupy both points of view on ourselves at once. Now, I want to claim 
that there ought to be an exactly similar distinction, not on the points of view that 
we have on ourselves that were Spinoza’s concern, but on the points of view we 
have on the world. The world too can be seen from a detached, third person or 
an engaged, first person point of view. And it is the availability of the world to 
us through its value properties (which move us to our first personal engagement 
with it) that provides the minimal continuity with the sacralized picture --the rest 
of which we cannot find palatable any longer.
 Thus putting it in the most abjectly simple terms, one might for instance 
find, from a certain perspective of the study of populations and disease and so 
on, that this or that segment of a population has a certain average daily caloric 
intake and that they, as a result, die of old age at an average in their late forties, 
a metaphor for their malnutrition. But that is only one perspective that I could 
take on the matter, one of detached, roughly scientific, study. I could then switch 
perspectives and see those very people as being in need. And the crucial point is 
that need a value notion quite unlike the notions of caloric counts and, therefore, 
it makes normative demands on me. To view the world from this quite other 
perspective is, as I said earlier, to view it from the point of view of engagement 
rather than detachment. To be able to perceive the evaluative aspects of the world, 
one therefore has to possess agency, one has to have the capacity to respond to its 
normative force. In fact, we experience ourselves as agents partly in the perceptions 
of such a value-laden world.
 Our agency and the evaluative enchantment of the world, then, are inseparably 
linked. That is why Spinoza’s insight about ourselves can be extended outwards 
onto the world. In a long and unsatisfactory philosophical tradition of moral 
psychology (deriving from philosophers such as Hume and Adam Smith), values 
are said to be given to us in our desires and moral sentiments. This is precisely 
the tradition that leaves out the evaluative properties from being in the world 
to which our agency responds. So here, then, is the absolutely crucial point. If 
my extension of Spinoza’s point is right, the objects of our desires must be given 
to us as desirable, that is, as desirabilities or value elements in the world itself. If 
they were not, if their givenness to us was not as “desirable” but as “desired” 
(as Hume and Adam Smith’s moral psychology claims) then they could only be 
given to us when we step outside of ourselves and perceive what our desires are 
from the third person point of view. But that is precisely to abdicate our agency, 
our first person point of view. Agency is possible only if we take the desirabilities 
or evaluative properties in the world itself as given to us in the experience of our 
desires.
 I have said that these evaluative properties are contained in the world and 
can be perceived or apprehended as such. But I have also said that this evaluative 
aspect of the world is nothing, it is darkness, to subjects that do not possess 
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agency, a capacity for normative engagement. One reductive confusion to watch 
out for here is to think that because subjects capable of agency and engagement 
alone are capable of perceiving values in the world external to them, that values 
must therefore not be external after all and ultimately come from us. Another–
related--confusion is to think that because some people may see some values in 
the world and others may not (you may see someone as being in need and be 
moved normatively by it, I may not), it is wrong to think that values are in the 
world at all and that we respond to them normatively--rather the world is indeed 
brute and value-free as Newton and Boyle claimed, and it is we who through our 
moral sentiments make up values and project them differentially onto the world. 
This is as confused as saying that because observation of things, of objects in the 
world, is theory-laden, i.e., because when we hold different physical theories we 
will perceive different objects in the world, we must therefore in some sense be 
making up objects. These confusions may be natural but they are elementary 
and are easy to identify and resist.
 A more ideological confusion that all this amounts to something unscientific 
is no less elementary, but being ideological it may be harder to resist. I’ve said 
that even irreligious people committed to scientific rationality in the thin sense 
of the term8 can embrace this way of thinking of the enchantment of the world 
because I insist that there is nothing unscientific about it. To view nature and 
the world not as brute but as containing value that makes normative demands 
on our agency is not by any means to be unscientific. It only means that natural 
science does not have full coverage of nature. In general, it is not unscientific to 
say that not all themes about nature are scientific themes. It is only unscientific 
to give unscientific responses to science’s themes--as hypotheses about creationism 
or intelligent of design do (being, as they are, responses to scientific questions 
about the origins the universe).
 The point here is not the point often made by so many that that we do not 
know very much scientifically. One can say that science knows only a very little 
bit of what might be known without in any way upsetting the scientistic naturalist 
picture that I think a re-enchantment of nature would and should upset. The 
point is not just to be humble about how little we have managed to come to 
know and may ever come to know, but to say that nature consists of more than 
science (at least as we know and understand it now) can know because it is not 
the business of science to cover all that is in nature.
 Nor is the point the same as the perfectly good point many have made before 
which is that science has told us how to study nature but not how to study the 
human subject. The point is rather that there is no studying what is special about 
human subjectivity unless we see nature and the world itself as often describable in 
terms that are not susceptible to the kind of inquiry that natural science or even 
social science provides. There is a revealing point here about someone like Weber 
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and his legacy. He, among others, is seen as having directed us to what is now 
fairly widely accepted as an undeniable truth, viz., that what makes the study of 
human beings stand apart from the natural sciences is that such study is “value-
laden.” But–bizarrely--he never linked this now familiar point explicitly with his 
own remarks about the disenchantment of nature. The fact is that there is no 
understanding what makes the study of human society stand apart by its value 
ladenness unless we see that fact as being of a piece with an equally fundamental 
insight about a value laden natural and human environment, in virtue of which 
our agential engagements with it are prompted. Without that further link the 
insight that the study of human society stands apart from scientific study in its 
value-ladenness is incomplete, and the claim to the naturalistic irreducibility of 
the human subject is shallow.
 I don’t want to give the slightly misleading impression that all I am concerned 
to deny, in order to gain an enchantment of the world that is continuous with 
something in the religious, is the scientistic picture which has it that natural 
science has total coverage of the world and nature. In fact that will not suffice and 
that is not all that I am concerned to say. This is because the scientistic picture 
accommodates much more than natural science.
 Under the influence of a familiar orientation in the social sciences, one 
might aspire to a certain picture of the world that concedes that one does not 
have to view it as brute. In other words, one can allow that it may contain more 
than what natural science studies, it contains opportunities for us to satisfy our 
desires. Thus, one might say, if I were to take a purely impersonal and scientific 
perspective on the world, I would see the water in the glass in front of me as 
H2O, but with the social scientific broadening of this perspective to include a 
certain expanded notion of scientific rationality, one could also see that very 
glass of water as an opportunity to satisfy a desire of mine, to quench my thirst. 
This loosens things up a bit to allow the world to contain such strange things 
as opportunities, something the physicist or chemist or biologist would never 
allow nor could study, since opportunities, whatever they are, are not the subject-
matter of these sciences. Rather they are the subject matter of Economics and 
more broadly the social and behavioral sciences which could now be seen to be, 
among other things, the science of desire-satisfaction in the light of (probabilistic) 
apprehension of the desire-satisfying properties in the world, i.e., opportunities 
that the world provides to satisfy our wants and preferences.
 But this is not the loosening up of the world that is needed for a secular 
enchantment of the world that is continuous with the religious. Though it grants 
that the world is not entirely brute and it grants that the world contains something 
(opportunities) that escapes the purview of the natural sciences, it doesn’t grant 
enough. It may be a first step but to stop there is merely to extend the reach 
of scientific rationality in the thick sense, it is not to show its limitations in 
Gandhi, Newton and the Enlightenment      73
14
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 38 [2008], No. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol38/iss1/4
its conception of nature and the world. Nothing short of seeing the world as 
containing values (an older Aristotelian idea, if recent writers such as McDowell 
read him rightly) does that, for it is values not opportunities that put moral 
demands on us. Thus even if we respond to others with a view to gratifying our 
moral sentiments of sympathy towards them, we are not quite yet on board with 
the depth of the demand that a perception of others’ needs is the perception of 
something that puts normative demands on our individual and collective agency. 
It is in this deep respect that Marx’s talk of needs in his slogan “From each 
according to his abilities to each according to his needs” went beyond the moral 
psychology of Hume and Adam Smith. Perceiving opportunities in the world 
merely tells us that the world is there for satisfying our desires and preferences, 
however filled with sympathy for others those desires are, but it doesn’t conceive 
of the desires themselves as responding to what I have described as “desirabilities” 
in the world. This has impoverishing implications for how we can think of more 
specific questions relevant to politics and political theory, implications I can 
do no more than hint at here by merely saying that I believe that it is why, for 
example, the endless bickering within the orthodox enlightenment’s framework 
about the extent to which one may or may not emphasize equality over liberty 
(or autonomy) cannot have an end within that framework precisely because the 
framework doesn’t have the conceptual ingredients to allow even those who 
favour the emphasis on equality to claim that values like equality are not separable 
from a fully meaningful autonomy, that they are an essential part of one’s own self-
realization (as a result of being moved by an evaluatively enchanted world which 
our agency collectively inhabits and to whose normative demands our agency 
responds). In short, equality when it is in concert with a range of other values 
that the world constrains us with and to which we respond is a value that then 
becomes an essential part of an unalienated life. Nothing short of perceiving in 
the world values that move our agency to respond in ethical terms, then, will re-
enchant it and help to arrest our alienation from it,9 providing the initial steps to 
a secular version of what Gandhi and the freethinkers of the seventeenth century 
were struggling to find.
 That the deliverances of their struggles yielded sacralized and pantheistic 
conceptions of the world with which we have little sympathy today, does not at all 
imply that those struggles were not honorable. But to say that their struggles are 
honorable is to say that they must be the antecedents to our own philosophical 
struggles to re-characterize the world and nature, and in doing so to reorient 
our entire range of social scientific and historiographic interests away from the 
obsessively causal explanatory methods that dominate them. This disciplinary 
reorientation based on such a re-view of nature may have some chance of laying 
the ground of resistance to the ubiquitously narrowing effects of the orthodox 
Enlightenment’s legacies not just in the universities but in our moral and political 
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lives generally.
 In a previous essay of mine called “What is a Muslim?”10 I had tried explicitly 
to locate the forms of political pacification that come from a loss of agency owing 
to a picture of things in which a third person, rather than a first person, point of 
view dominates our conception of ourselves and our cultural and political identity. 
In the present lecture I have tried to integrate those ideas with the politics that 
grew around the new science for the first time some centuries ago as a result of 
an increasingly third person conception not of ourselves, but of the world and 
nature. Many more deep connections between metaphysics, moral psychology and 
politics and culture still need to be drawn which I could not possibly have drawn 
here and likely don’t have the intellectual powers ever to do, before anything 
of genuinely theoretical ambition is constructed on the subjects of identity, 
democratic politics, and disenchantment. But even without them it is possible 
at least to state the issues and aspirations at stake.
 What Gandhi’s and the early freethinkers’ intellectual efforts made thinkable, 
and what I am trying to consolidate in secular terms in my last many remarks, 
is something that goes measurably beyond what recent scholars have started 
saying is our best and only bet: the placing of constraints on an essentially utilitarian 
framework so as to provide for a social democratic safety net for the worst off. 
Salutary though the idea of such a safety net is (how could it fail to be given 
the wretched conditions of the worst off?), it is a project of limited ambition, in 
which Adam Smith and Hume remain the heroes and Condorcet (among others) 
is wheeled in as the radical who proposed the sort of requisite constraints we 
need. In a recent book, Gareth Stedman Jones,11 chastened by the failures to 
put into practice more ambitious intellectual frameworks, comes to just these 
modest conclusions about our world as we have inherited it from these more 
ambitious theories and their failures. By contrast, the heroes of this lecture, 
Gandhi and the key dissenting figures of the 17th century, through whose lens I 
have been reading him, wanted it to be at least thinkable that that world could 
be “turned upside down”–not entirely, not all at once, but in places where the 
reach of thick rationality has not been comprehensive and where there might 
be scope for some reversal and re-enchantment. Gandhi in many of his writings 
had nobly aspired to the argument that India as it first struggled for its freedom 
and then later came to be poised to gain independence from colonial rule, was 
just such a place.
Columbia University
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